Tag Archive for: can’t

YouTube TV adds channels and raises price—you can’t opt out of either change

A person's hand holding an Apple TV remote in front of a TV screen displaying the app icons for YouTube and other services.

Enlarge (credit: Getty Images | Onfokus)

YouTube launched its competitor to cable TV two years ago, charging $ 35 a month, but it’s now over 40 percent more expensive.

Google raised the price of YouTube TV to $ 40 in March 2018 and yesterday announced it’s raising the price again, this time to $ 49.99. In both cases, the Google-owned streaming TV service paired the price hike with extra channels, but subscribers have to pay the new, higher price whether they want the new channels or not.

“To keep bringing you the best service possible, we are also updating our membership pricing,” YouTube TV told subscribers in an email yesterday. “The price for new and existing members will be $ 49.99/month.”

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Biz & IT – Ars Technica

Sheriffs’ Union Boss Says Officers Have No Reason To Do Their Job If They Can’t Score Forfeiture Cash On The Side

Civil asset forfeiture is an abomination loaded with perverse incentives for law enforcement. Investigations and convictions are too much work. Seizing cash from random motorists or residents is so much easier than legitimate police work. The laws barely governing this practice allow the agency performing the seizure to keep all or most of what’s seized, which has led directly to the widespread abuse we see around us today.

The practice always has its defenders. Most of those defenders come from the same agencies that are directly profiting from asset forfeiture. They say the expected stuff about fighting the good Drug War — that taking $ 500 from a random motorist somehow creates a ripple effect felt all the way at the top of the drug distribution chain. Everyone knows they’re full of shit, but there are enough true believers in most state legislatures that the practice remains largely unaltered across the United States.

But there are some outliers. Some people see the perverse incentives asset forfeiture creates and say perverted cops are the best cops.

Jarrod Bruder, the executive director of the South Carolina Sheriff’s Association who frequently lobbies for law enforcement interests at the Statehouse, said that without the incentive of profit from civil forfeiture, officers probably wouldn’t pursue drug dealers and their cash as hard as they do now.

If police don’t get to keep the money from forfeiture, “what is the incentive to go out and make a special effort?” Bruder said. “What is the incentive for interdiction?”

I don’t know… how about IT’S YOUR FUCKING JOB. This is a law enforcement professional who actually thinks cops won’t do cop work unless they can periodically seize cash from people they interact with. Hey, Mr. Bruder, if cops can’t solicit bribes or extort protection money from local businesses, why should they be bothered to patrol neighborhoods or respond to robbery calls?

If Wells Fargo account reps can’t sign people up for accounts without their knowledge or permission, why should they even show up to help people open accounts or deal with banking issues? If an entrepreneur can’t rope investors into a pyramid scheme, why even bother getting out of bed at 4 am to bathe in the glow of inflated self-worth? Come on, Bruder. How can you be so obtuse?

There’s nothing quite like a law enforcement union rep telling the public the police are only willing to work when they can directly profit from their efforts. That’s the kind of word-of-mouth advertising asset forfeiture reform efforts need… courtesy of a union rep who doesn’t want the practice ended, much less altered.

That’s the stupidest thing said in defense of asset forfeiture in this article from the Greenville News, which gathers law enforcement responses to its investigation of the unsavory tactics deployed by state agencies. Even victims of crime aren’t off limits. Local cops will take money right off the kitchen counter when investigating murders and claim the $ 43 pocketed was the result of criminal activity.

But it’s not the only stupid thing said by law enforcement reps defending forfeiture.

Clemson Police Chief Jimmy Dixon said if police didn’t get to collect forfeiture money, it would hamper the department’s ability to conduct long-term drug surveillance.

“It could potentially shut down our K-9 unit,” he said. “Overall, our ability to conduct undercover narcotics operations could be stifled.”

Lt. Jake Mahoney with the Aiken Police Department said they’d have to divert money from the budget to cover drug enforcement.

Greenwood Police Chief Gerald Brooks said it would “sharply curtail our drug enforcement activities.”

Sounds like another set of cops with motivation problems. But even if you believe they’re not like the union rep quoted above them, they’re still complaining about possibly not being able to do something they’re not legally allowed to do.

Forfeiture proceeds are not meant to be written into a budget or counted on for recurring expenses, but should be treated as a supplement to provide for extra training or equipment, according to the law and legal opinions.

Those are the arguments in favor of asset forfeiture: cops won’t do their job if they can’t earn cash on the side and budgets, that aren’t supposed to include forfeiture funds, will experience shortfalls because chickens cops aren’t supposed to count will no longer be hatched. Nice work, so-called drug warriors. It isn’t — and never has been — about dismantling the drug trade. If law enforcement ever made a serious dent in crime, the extra money would dry up. And that’s something they’re just not going to allow to happen.

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Judge: Law Enforcement Can’t Force Suspects to Unlock iPhones with FaceID

A ruling found that coercing suspects to open their phones using biometrics violates the fourth and fifth amendments.
Mobile Security – Threatpost | The first stop for security news

Can’t Wish Away The Mistakes In The Original ‘Stairway To Heaven’ Verdict

Yesterday we published the first part of an analysis by copyright lawyer Rick Sanders who wrote up a thorough analysis of the recent 9th Circuit decision to overturn the jury verdict in a case involving whether or not the Led Zeppelin song “Stairway to Heaven” infringed on another song. The first part described how the 9th Circuit might be correct a problematic “test” for infringement, and this part analyzes the problems with the jury instructions.

Last time, I explained why I thought the Ninth Circuit’s recent vacating and remanding of the jury verdict in Led Zeppelin’s favor was, long-term, a good thing for copyright law (even if I kind of liked the verdict and am genuinely sorry for Led Zeppelin). The reason is that the reversal gave one panel of the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to try to fix the Ninth Circuit’s unhelpful legal framework for determining copyright infringement.

But that isn’t why the panel reversed. While the panel did make some suggestions about how to present the “inverse-ratio” rule to the jury, the way it was presented to the original jury isn’t what merited reversal. What merited reversal was the lack of another jury instruction about a basic and uncontroversial principle of copyright law that the parties agreed should have been there in some form. In short, the case is being reversed — and the Ninth Circuit is getting a chance to fix its own weird copyright law — because of what appears to have been a brain fart.

Jury Instructions: An Introduction

We all gasped when we heard about the reversal. Jury verdicts are hardly ever reversed. One of the few ways a jury verdict can be thrown out is if the jury was badly instructed in the law. Juries, naturally, don’t bring any knowledge about the law with them when they serve. That’s not their job, really. Their job is to weigh evidence, make credibility determinations, and so forth. But at some point, they need to be told what the law is, so they can take all that evidence they weighed and apply it to the law and render a verdict. How this is accomplished might surprise you.

There are several ways for jury instructions to be prepared and delivered to a jury, but the main way is this. First, the parties’ attorneys confer about what jury instructions they can agree on and jointly submit those instructions to the court. In this, they are aided by pattern jury instructions prepared at the circuit court’s direction. But pattern jury instructions don’t cover every aspect of every area of the law. You’d need ever-updating volumes to do that. Also, the pattern jury instructions aren’t unassailable: a party might disagree with one and explain how it should be and why.

For all other jury instructions, the parties submit their own versions of instructions they think address all of the legal issues being raised at trial, together with a short explanation of the legal authorities for their versions. The judge decides which version to use, or the judge might even craft his or her own version based on their own research.

Are the instructions then typed up, collated and distributed to the jurors in a neat binder? No! The judge reads them to the jurors, at the very end of the case, during what is called the “jury charge.” The jurors have to memorize the instructions (though they can ask to re-hear specific ones later during their deliberations).

“Selection and Arrangement”: An Introduction

In this case, the parties agreed that they needed an instruction about what to do with a work that is made up of unprotectable elements. Just because your work is made up of lots of unprotectable elements, that doesn’t mean your work as a whole can’t be protected by copyright. If you put those unprotectable elements together in an original way, then the way you put those elements together is protectable, though not the individual elements themselves. After all, you can theoretically dissect any creative work down into non-protectable elements: individual notes, individual words and phrases, individual brushstrokes, etc. It’s what you do with those non-protectable elements that counts. Courts call this “selection and arrangement,” which makes it seem more abstract than it is.

In this case, the plaintiffs hold the copyright in the song “Taurus,” which has for years been rumored as the inspiration for Led Zeppelin’s “Stairway to Heaven.” (But inspiration isn’t infringement! Well, at least, not necessarily.) When the plaintiffs finally got around to suing, Led Zeppelin argued (among other things) that any similarities between the songs were only for non-protectable elements, like the use of the chromatic scale. Plaintiffs argued that, even if that were true, the “selection and arrangement” of those elements were original (and, by implication, that “Stairway to Heaven” took that selection and arrangement).

Both parties recognized the need for an instruction on this issue. They disagreed on what it should say. They submitted competing instructions for the judge to consider. Then came the jury charge, at the very end of the case, just before the jury began deliberations. The judge began to read the instructions. Now, normally, a party would have an opportunity to object on the record to an instruction. This is a prerequisite to complaining about it on appeal. But the judge here didn’t want to hear any objections. He reasoned that, if the parties disagreed about an instruction in their submissions, it was reasonable to assume that they would object to an instruction that didn’t match what they’d submitted.

The parties waited for the instruction about what to do with works made up of unprotectable elements. It never came. This was good for Led Zeppelin, though not ideal. On the one hand, since Led Zeppelin had presented evidence that all they’d taken (if anything) from “Taurus” was not protectable, such an instruction couldn’t help their argument, no matter how it was crafted. On the other hand, it was foreseeable at the time that the missing jury instruction could imperil a jury verdict in Led Zeppelin’s favor (assuming they could focus on it with 500 other things going on at that moment.

On appeal, the strongest argument — that trial court was correct not to give the instruction — wasn’t really available to Led Zeppelin because even it had suggested an instruction. (Led Zeppelin tried anyway.) Instead, it had to argue that the missing instruction made no difference to the jury’s deliberations. That’s where another major goof with the jury instructions came in.

Copyright’s Broad Scope

Nearly all copyright cases will need an instruction about originality. Without “originality,” there is no copyright. Originality, however, is pretty easy to achieve. All that’s really required is that the work be expressive (i.e., not just ideas) and the product of a human mind. This last requirement not only excludes things like the “monkey selfie,” but also things like underlying facts, which exist independent of human thought; and stock “tools of the trade” commonly available to everyone in the creative field, like stock characters, computer code that everyone uses, certain three chord progressions, and so forth (what lawyers call “scènes à faire”). It also excludes material the author copied from other works (including those in the public domain), but only if the author actually copied them. Originality doesn’t mean novelty, just that it’s the author’s independent expression.

Originality is so basic to copyright law that there’s actually one of those “pattern jury instructions” about it. Pattern jury instructions aren’t law and aren’t always appropriate in every instance, but departure from them demands explanation. The court took the model instruction and added the stuff in bold and took out the stuff that’s been struck through:

An original work may include or incorporate elements taken from works owned by others, with the owner’s permission. However, any elements from prior works or the public domain are not considered original parts and not protected by copyright. Instead, [t]he original parts of the plaintiff’s work are the parts created:

1. independently by the work’s author, that is, the author did not copy it from another work; and
2. by use of at least some minimal creativity.

In copyright law, the “original” part of a work need not be new or novel.

You might detect a pattern here (as it were). The instruction about how to treat works consisting of non-protectable elements was left out. Now the instruction about originality includes a new sentence that emphasizes how non-protectable elements aren’t protectable, without telling the jury that those non-protectable elements can be selected and arranged in a protectable way.

What it Means to Create

I don’t know if copyright has a single “heart.” Perhaps, like an octopus, it has several hearts. But surely one of copyright law’s hearts is that creativity can and often does build on the work of others. This idea is echoed in fair use. And it is echoed in the non-controversial idea that not every element of a work must be protectable for the work to be entitled to copyright protection. “Selection and arrangement” is just a stilted and abstract way of saying: if you give 100 kids the same collection of 100 lego bricks, you will have 100 different original works in about 30 minutes, even though no single lego brick is protectable and even though the 100 different original works will naturally share certain techniques in common.

These two errors in the jury instructions aren’t just about technicalities of a highly technical law. Goodness knows there’s a lot of those in copyright law. No, they go to one of the basic tenets of copyright law: what it means to create.

My charitable interpretation of all this is that the court had a major brain fart that Led Zeppelin’s lawyers didn’t see coming or didn’t fully understand how perilous the consequences would be. The other interpretation is that this was a legal strategy that worked too well and backfired badly. It’s too bad. I strongly suspect that a correctly instructed jury would have come to the same verdict, but the scale of this mistake is such that we can’t safely assume that. I also strongly suspect Led Zeppelin will prevail on remand—after incurring more expense, lost time and anxiety.

Rick Sanders is a trademark, trade secrets and copyright litigator and a founding partner of Aaron & Sanders, PLLC. From 2012 to 2014, he was an adjunct professor at Vanderbilt University Law School, where he was teaching Copyright Law. He blogs at IPBreakdown and tweets at @RickSandersLaw.

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